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Abstract
The recent plunge in oil prices has brought into question the generally accepted
view that lower oil prices are good for the US and the global economy. In this paper,
using a quarterly multi-country econometric model, we rst show that a fall in oil
prices lowers interest rates and ination in most countries, and increases global real
equity prices. The e¤ects on real output are positive, although they take longer to
materialize (around 4 quarters after the shock). We then re-examine the e¤ects of low
oil prices on the US economy over di¤erent sub-periods using monthly observations on
real oil prices, real equity prices and real dividends. We conrm the perverse positive
relationship between oil and equity prices over the period since the 2008 nancial crisis
highlighted in the recent literature, but show that this relationship has been unstable
when considered over the longer time period of 19462016. In contrast, we nd a stable
negative relationship between oil prices and real dividends which we argue is a better
proxy for economic activity (as compared to equity prices). On the supply side, the
e¤ects of lower oil prices di¤er widely across the di¤erent oil producers, and could be
perverse initially, as some of the major oil producers try to compensate their loss of
revenues by raising production. Taking demand and supply adjustments to oil price
changes as a whole, we conclude that oil markets equilibrate but rather slowly, with
large episodic swings between low and high oil prices.
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1 Introduction
Oil markets have experienced frequent episodes of boom and bust, ever since oil was produced
in large commercial quantities in Pennsylvania back in 1859. Real oil prices (WTI in 2015
US dollar) have uctuated between highs of $145 to lows of $15 per barrel over the period
1946M1 and 2016M6 (Figure 1). The control of oil markets by the major international oil
companies, the so called Seven Sisters, backed by the UK and US governments, meant low
and relatively steady oil prices until the late 1960s. However, a new era began with the
foundation of OPEC in 1960, the 1968 coup in Libya which led to new agreements initially
with the independent oil companies and then with the Seven Sisters across all major oil
producers in the Middle East and elsewhere, not to mention the start of a downward trend
in US oil production in 1971. As a result, oil markets entered a new phase as the Seven
Sisters lost control to markets and oil producers, oil prices quadrupled, ushering in an era of
high oil price volatility and frequent periods of boom and bust often triggered by military
and political events.
Figure 1: Nominal and Real (2015 US dollars) WTI Oil Prices
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Data sources: United States Energy Information Administration (EIA).
In fact, since 1986 there have been six episodes of sharp decline in oil prices (30% or
more in each episode), in a relatively short period of time (within seven months), and with
relatively large e¤ects on the global economy (see Figure 1 and Ba¤es et al. 2015). Therefore,
while the fall in oil prices since June 2014 is large, it is by no means unprecedented, and there
is an extensive literature on the economic consequences of oil shocks for the global economy
in terms of their impacts on real output and real equity prices, see for instance, Hamilton
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(2009), Kilian (2009), Cashin et al. (2014), Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016), and Mohaddes
and Raissi (2015) among others. Overall the literature suggests that the initial impacts of
oil price changes di¤er widely across di¤erent countries, with oil importers beneting from
the fall in oil prices (once demand conditions are controlled for) and oil exporters losing from
the price fall.
The recent plunge in oil prices has, however, brought into question the generally accepted
view that lower oil prices are good for the US and the global economy. It has been argued
that near-zero interest rates in most industrialized economies, and the fact that the US
has started to export crude oil again, have altered the traditional channels through which
the benet of lower oil prices gets transmitted to the real economy (Obstfeld et al. 2016).
Moreover, it has been suggested that the positive correlation between oil prices and equity
markets in the past few years provides evidence of a slowdown in global economic activity,
as a softening of global aggregate demand has reduced rmsprots and demand for oil
(Bernanke 2016). Therefore, it is argued that the decline in oil prices this time around is not
good news for the US economy, and by implication for the rest of the industrialized global
economy.
But the overall net outcome for the global economy is far more complicated and depends
on domestic political economy considerations and the feedback e¤ects of oil price changes
on global energy demand, interest rates, nancial markets, and world trade. It is worth
noting that much of the literature on oil and the macroeconomy does not use a multi-
country framework, and instead uses a single-country VAR model, as representing the global
economy. The majority of such studies in fact consider the e¤ects of oil shocks exclusively
on the United States, with the analysis being done mainly in isolation from the rest of
the world. See, for instance, Kilian (2009). Unfortunately, these single-country models not
only fail to take account of economic interlinkages and spillovers that exist between di¤erent
regions, but more importantly their single-country framework does not allow them to consider
heterogeneities across and within oil importers and exporters, which are arguably essential
to analyzing the global oil market.
Given that there are many channels through which oil prices can a¤ect economic activity
(both real and nancial) in the US and elsewhere, one could for instance use the Global
Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) modelling approach to capture the complicated patterns of
global economic interactions; taking into account not only the direct exposure of countries to
the shocks but also the indirect e¤ects through secondary or tertiary channels. The GVAR
is a multi-country framework which links country-specic models in a coherent manner using
time series and panel data techniques and has been used in bank stress testing, the analysis
of Chinas emergence on the rest of world economy, international transmission of real and
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nancial shocks, and forecasting (see, for instance, Chudik and Pesaran 2016). To this end,
we use the GVAR-Oil model developed in Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016), estimated using
quarterly data between 1979Q2 and 2013Q1, and investigate the e¤ects that a negative
short-term oil price fall has on the US and the rest of the world economy. We nd that the
fall in oil prices tends to lower interest rates and ination in most countries, and increase
global real equity prices, with these e¤ects showing up relatively quickly, typically within two
quarters. However, the positive real output e¤ects, both at the global level and at the country
levels, take longer to materialize following an oil price fall, with the positive median impulse
responses generally manifesting themselves in the medium-term, around four quarters after
a negative oil price shock.
To investigate whether there has been a change in the macroeconomic e¤ects of recent
falls in oil prices, we need to consider the output-oil price relationship over a number of
sub-periods, including the recent post-2008 episode of oil boom and bust. Unfortunately,
however, quarterly macro time series that exist are not su¢ ciently long for a reliable analysis
of output-oil price relationship over di¤erent sub-periods, particularly the post-2008 crisis
period. Therefore, it is not possible to use the GVAR-Oil model for this purpose, and an al-
ternative modelling strategy is required. Instead we consider bivariate relationships between
oil prices, equity prices, dividends and monthly industrial and manufacturing output, as
alternative proxies for real economic activity. Using such monthly observations from the US,
we illustrate that there is no stable relationship between real oil prices and equity returns over
the last 71 years and so the perverse response of equity markets to oil price changes should
not be taken as evidence that lower oil prices are no longer benecial for the US and the
world economy. In fact, using relatively long time series on dividends and oil prices we show
that, as in previous episodes of falling oil prices, lower oil prices improve prot opportunities
and dividends in the oil importing economies which is overall good for the world economy.
This supports the ndings from the GVAR-Oil model. However, due to uncertainties over
the Brexit negotiations, economic and trade policies under the new US administration, the
threat of terrorism, and the surge in nancial market volatility (to mention but a few), it is
likely that there will be a delay in the materialization of any economic benets of lower oil
prices for the global economy as a whole.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a multi-country
approach to examine the e¤ects of lower oil prices, namely the GVAR-Oil model, and in-
vestigates the global macroeconomic consequences of a fall in oil prices using quarterly data
between 1979Q2 and 2013Q1. Section 3 re-examines the e¤ects of low oil prices on the US
economy, particularly over the post-2008 period, using monthly regression analysis based on
data on oil prices and indicators of market (S&P 500) and real economic activity (proxied
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by dividends on the S&P 500) over the 1946-2016 period. Finally, Section 4 o¤ers some con-
cluding remarks and argues that the response of oil producers (OPEC and non-OPEC) to
price changes this time around di¤ers markedly, mainly due to the US oil supply revolution.
2 Analyzing the oil market using a multi-country model
We use the global quarterly econometric model recently developed in Mohaddes and Pesaran
(2016) to investigate the e¤ects of oil price shocks and their transmission in the global econ-
omy. This framework is particularly suited to our purposes since it models global oil markets
separately from the country-specic vector autoregressive models, by specifying an oil price
equation which takes account of global demand conditions as well as oil supply conditions
across some of the major oil producing countries. The model of the oil market is then in-
tegrated within a compact quarterly model of the global economy comprising 27 countries
(see Table 1), with the euro area being treated as a single economy, using a dynamic multi-
country framework rst advanced by Pesaran et al. (2004), known as the Global VAR (or
GVAR for short). This approach allows for an analysis of the international macroeconomic
transmission of the e¤ects of country-specic shocks, taking into account not only the di-
rect exposure of countries to the shocks but also the indirect e¤ects through secondary and
tertiary channels.
Table 1: Countries and Regions in the GVAR-Oil Model
Major Oil Producers Other Countries
Net Exporters Europe Asia Pacic Latin America
Canada Euro Area Australia Argentina
Indonesia Austria India Chile
Iran Belgium Japan Peru
Mexico Finland Korea
Norway France Malaysia
Saudi Arabia Germany New Zealand Rest of the World
Italy Philippines South Africa
Net Importers Netherlands Singapore Turkey
Brazil Spain Thailand
China Sweden
United Kingdom Switzerland
United States
The individual country-specic models are solved in a global setting where core macroeco-
nomic variables of each economy (real GDP, ination, real exchange rate, short and long-term
interest rates, and oil production) are related to corresponding foreign variables, (also known
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as "star" variables) constructed to match the international trade pattern of the country un-
der consideration. Star variables serve as proxies for common unobserved factors and a¤ect
the global economy in addition to the set of observed common factors (such as oil prices
and global equity prices). Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016) estimate the 27 country-specic
VARX* models over the period 1979Q2 to 2013Q1 separately and then combine these with
the estimates from the global oil market, which they refer to as the GVAR-Oil model.
There are many advantages to using a multi-country framework. Firstly, the disaggre-
gated nature of the GVAR-Oil model allows one to identify country-specic shocks and
answer counterfactual questions regarding the possible macroeconomic e¤ects of oil supply
disruptions in specic geographical areas on the global economy. This is in contrast to most
of the literature that focuses on the identication of global supply shocks, rather than shocks
to a specic country or region.1 Secondly, it allows one to deal with inherent heterogeneities
that exist across countries, not only at the geopolitical level but also in terms of oil reserves
and production capacities, to mention but a few.2 Thirdly, the model allows one to take
into account the economic interlinkages and spillovers that exist between di¤erent regions,
thereby enabling a study of the global economy in a coherent manner as opposed to under-
taking single country-by-country analyses. In this paper we use this multi-country model to
investigate the e¤ects of a fall in oil prices on the global economy, both at the country and
the aggregate level. But before describing our results, we rst provide a short exposition of
the GVAR-Oil model.
2.1 The GVAR-Oil model
To simplify the exposition we consider the following simple dynamic oil price equation, but
consider more general dynamic specication in the empirical application:
~pot = cp + 1~p
o
t 1 + 1yt 1 + 1q
o
t 1 + u
o
t ; (1)
1Note that the di¢ culty in identifying supply and demand shocks in single-country VAR models, has
been recognized in the literature. Indeed, the main focus of the literature has been to consider alternative
identication schemes in the context of VAR models without a clear consensus. The attempt to identify the
global shocks has usually been based on a structural VAR approach making use of a priori sign restrictions;
see, for instance, Baumeister and Peersman (2013), Cashin et al. (2014), Chudik and Fidora (2012), and
Kilian (2009). Furthermore, it is unclear how a global supply shock can be motivated considering that
changes to oil supplies are region and country specic.
2For instance, the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2016) reports that 14% of the total
proven oil reserves in the world is located in North America, while more than 47% is located in the Middle
East, with signicant heterogeneity of production costs between the two regions. See also the discussion in
Esfahani et al. (2013, 2014).
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where
yt =
NX
i=1
wiyit; and qot =
NX
i=1
woi q
o
it; (2)
yit and qoit are the real income and quantity of oil output of country i at time t; respectively,
wi and woi are the weights attached to country i
0s real income and oil production in the
construction of the world GDP (yt) and oil supply (qot ), ~p
o
t is the weighted average of country-
specic log real oil prices, dened by
~pot =
NX
i=1
!i~p
o
it; (3)
~poit = ln (P
o
t Eit=Pit) = p
o
t + (eit   pit) ; (4)
P ot is the nominal price of oil in US dollar, Eit is country i
th exchange rate measured by
the units of country ith currency in one US dollar, and Pit is the general level of prices
in country i. uot represents the global oil demand shock to be distinguished from country-
specic oil supply shocks dened in the country-specic models (specied below). The above
decomposition of country-specic real oil prices into the US dollar price component and the
"real" exchange rate component (here dened by epit = eit   pit) is important, since only
the US dollar oil price component, pot , can be regarded as weakly exogenous.
3 The real
exchange rate component, epit, is determined endogenously with the other variables in the
country-specic models, such as interest rates and real output.
In order to integrate the oil price equation within a multi-country set-up we need to
write the oil price equation in terms of pot . To this end using (4) in (3) we rst note that
~pot = p
o
t + ept, where
4
ept =
NX
i=1
!iepit: (5)
Using this result the oil price equation can be written as
pot + ept = cp + 1
 
pot 1 + ept 1

+ 1yt 1 + 1q
o
t 1 + u
o
t : (6)
In the GVAR set-up, the country-specic variables, epit; yit and qoit , are determined jointly
with the other macro variables. Specically, we consider the following country-specic models
3We formally test the weak exogeneity assumption and provide the test results in Appendix B.
4In the literature, the real oil price is typically computed by deating the nominal oil price with the US
general price index. But as our analysis shows, for global analysis such a procedure is not valid unless the
law of one price holds universally, namely if EitPUS;t = Pit for all i. Only under such stringent conditions it
follows that ~pot = p
o
t +
PN
i=1 !i ln (Eit=Pit) = p
o
t +
PN
i=1 !i ln (1=PUS;t) = p
o
t   pUS;t.
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(for i = 1; 2; :::; N)
xit = ai0 + ai1t+ixi;t 1 +i0xit +i1x

i;t 1 +i0p
o
t +i1p
o
t 1 + uit; (7)
where ai0; ai1;i;i0;i1;i0;and i1 are vectors/matrices of xed coe¢ cients that vary
across countries, xit is ki  1 vector of country-specic endogenous variables that include
epit; yit, and qoit (as applicable), and x

it is k

i  1 vector of country-specic weakly exogenous
(or star) variables. The starvariables are constructed using country-specic trade shares,
and are dened by
xit =
NX
j=1
wijxjt; (8)
where wij; i; j = 1; 2; :::N; are bilateral trade weights, with wii = 0; and
PN
j=1wij = 1.
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In our application each country-specic model has a maximum of six endogenous vari-
ables. Using the same terminology as in equation (7), the ki  1 vector of country-specic
endogenous variables is dened as xit =
 
qoit; yit; it; epit; r
S
it; r
L
it;
0
, where qoit is the log of
oil production at time t for country i, yit is the log of real Gross Domestic Product, it is the
rate of ination, epit is the log deated exchange rate, and rSit
 
rLit

is the short (long) term
interest rate, if country i is a major oil producer, otherwise xit =
 
yit; it; epit; r
S
it; r
L
it;
0
.6
The model for the US di¤ers from the rest in two respects: given the importance of US
nancial variables in the global economy, the log of world real equity prices, eqt, is included
in the US model as an endogenous variable, and as weakly exogenous in the other country
models (eqit = eqt), whilst US dollar exchange rates are included as endogenous variables
in all models except for the United States. The endogenous variables of the US model are
therefore given by xUS;t =
 
eqt; q
o
US;t; yUS;t; US;t; r
S
US;t; r
L
US;t
0
:
In the case of all countries, except for the US and the euro area, the foreign variables
included in the country-specic models, computed as in equation (8), are given by xit = 
eqit; y

it; 

it; ep

it; r
S
it ; r
L
it
0
. The trade weights are computed as three-year averages over
20072009.7 We excluded the foreign ination variable, EA;t, from the euro model since,
based on some preliminary tests, we could not maintain that EA;t is weakly exogenous.
5The main justication for using bilateral trade weights, as opposed to nancial weights for instance,
is that the former have been shown to be the most important determinant of national business cycle co-
movements. See Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), among others. See also, for instance, Cashin et al. (2017b)
who demonstrate that the choice of weights is of second-order importance when the underlying variables are
su¢ ciently correlated, and that using trade, nancial, or mixed weights produces very similar results.
6Note that long-term interest rates are not available for all countries, and short-term and long-term
interest rates are not available in the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia.
7A similar approach has also been followed in the case of Global VAR models estimated in the literature.
See, for example, Dees et al. (2007) and Cashin et al. (2017a, 2017b).
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Also, given the pivotal role played by the US in global nancial markets, we excluded the
foreign interest rates, rSUS;t and r
L
US;t, from the US model. The exclusion of these variables
from the US model was also supported by preliminary test results showing that rSUS;t and
rLUS;t cannot be assumed to be weakly exogenous when included in the US model. A similar
result was found when the foreign ination variable, US;t, was included in the US model.
In short, the US model includes only two foreign variables, namely xUS;t = (y

US;t; ep

US;t)
0;
where epUS;t =
PN
j=1wUSA;j(ejt   pjt); wUSA;j is the share of US trade with country j, ejt is
the log of US dollar exchange rate with respect to the currency of country j, and pjt is the
log CPI price index of country j.
The country-specic VARX* models in (7) are combined with the oil price equation,
(6), and solved simultaneously for all the endogenous variables collected in the vector,
zt = (p
o
t ;x
0
1t;x
0
2t; :::;x
0
Nt)
0 = (pot ;x
0
t)
0. This combined model is referred to as the GVAR-
Oil model, which allows for a two-way linkage between the global economy and oil prices.
Changes in the global economic conditions and oil supplies a¤ect oil prices with a lag, with
oil prices potentially inuencing all country-specic variables. Similarly, changes in oil sup-
plies, determined in country models for the major oil producers, are a¤ected by oil prices
and in turn a¤ect oil prices with a lag as specied in the oil price equation, (6).
Although estimation is carried out on a country-by-country basis, the GVAR model is
solved for oil prices and all country variables simultaneously, taking account of the fact
that all variables are endogenous to the system as a whole. To solve for the endogenous
variables, zt, using (8) we rst note that xit = Wixt, where Wi is a k

i  (k + 1), matrix
of xed constants (which are either 0 or 1 or some pre-specied weights, wij), k =
PN
i=1 ki,
ki = dim(x

it). Stacking the country-specic models we now have
xt = 't +xt 1 +H0xt +H1xt 1 +0p
o
t +1p
o
t 1 + ut;
where
 =
0BBBB@
1 0    0
0 2    0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0    N
1CCCCA ; H0 =
0BBBB@
10W1
20W2
...
N0WN
1CCCCA , H1 =
0BBBB@
11W1
21W2
...
N1WN
1CCCCA ,
't =
0BBBB@
a10 + a11t
a20 + a21t
...
aN0 + aN1t
1CCCCA , 0 =
0BBBB@
10
20
...
N0
1CCCCA , 1 =
0BBBB@
11
21
...
N1
1CCCCA , ut =
0BBBB@
u1t
u2t
...
uNt
1CCCCA :
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We also note that the oil price equation (6) can be written as
pot +w
0
epxt = cp + 1
 
pot 1 +w
0
epxt 1

+
 
1w
0
y + 1w
0
q

xt 1 + uot ;
where wep, wy and wq are k  1 vectors whose elements are either zero or are set equal
to the weights wi or w0i , assigned to epit, yit or q
o
it, as implied by (5) and (2), respectively.
Combining the above oil price equation with the country-specic models we obtain 
1 w0ep
 0 Ik  H0
! 
pot
xt
!
=
 
cp
't
!
+
 
1 1w
0
ep+1w
0
y + 1w
0
q
1 +H1
! 
pot 1
xt 1
!
+
 
uot
ut
!
;
(9)
which can be written more compactly as
G0zt = bt +G1zt 1 + vt:
Under the assumption that Ik   H0 is invertible the GVAR-Oil model has the following
reduced form solution
zt = at + Fzt 1 + t; (10)
where at = G 10 bt; F = G
 1
0 G1; and t = G
 1
0 vt:
2.2 E¤ects of a fall in oil prices
We use the GVAR-Oil model to examine the direct and indirect e¤ects of negative oil price
shocks on the world economy, on a country-by-country basis, and provide the time prole
of the e¤ects on real outputs across countries, interest rates, ination and real global eq-
uity prices. As explained earlier, the modelling approach is based on that in Mohaddes
and Pesaran (2016), where country-specic estimates and associated diagnostic tests can be
found.8
Figure 2 displays the plots of generalized impulse responses for the e¤ects of a negative
short-term oil price shock on global real equity prices, long-term interest rates, as well as real
output (based on PPP-GDP weighted responses of the 27 countries in our sample). It can
be seen that negative oil price changes tend to increase real equity prices and reduce interest
rates. The same pattern is also evident when considering the country-by-country impulse
8In particular, see Section 4.1 of Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016) for the estimates of the oil price equation
and Section 4.2 for estimates of the country-specic VARX* models including discussions about lag order
selection, cointegrating relations, and persistence proles. Evidence for the weak exogeneity assumption of
the foreign variables and discussion of the issue of structural breaks in the context of the GVAR-Oil model
is given in Appendix B of Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016). Finally, for various data sources used to build the
quarterly dataset, covering 1979Q2 to 2013Q1, and for the construction of the variables see Appendix A.
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responses. In particular, Figure 3 illustrates the fall in long-term interest rates across the
major economies in the world following an oil price decline.9 We also nd strong disination
pressures in all major (net) oil importers (see Figure 4). These results are as expected, and
are in line with those reported in the literature. See, for instance, Dees et al. (2007).
Figure 2: E¤ects of Lower Oil Prices on Global Real Equity Prices, Long-Term
Interest Rates, and Real GDP
Global Real Equity Prices Global Long-Term Interest Rates
Global Real GDP Oil Prices
Notes: Figures show median impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation decrease in oil prices, with 95
percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The horizon is quarterly.
While the responses of global equity prices, long-term interest rates and ination show up
relatively quickly and within a few quarters, the e¤ects of oil price changes on real output,
both at individual country levels and globally, take longer to manifest themselves. More
specically, the impulse responses for global GDP following an oil price fall is positive in the
medium-term (Figure 2), which is also the case for the individual country responses in Figure
5, although being statistically insignicant in most cases. Thus the empirical evidence based
on the GVAR-Oil model (and the general shape of the impulse responses) supports the view
9The results for the other countries in our sample, listed in Table 1, are not reported here, but are
available on request.
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Figure 3: E¤ects of Lower Oil Prices on Long-Term Interest Rates in Various
Countries
United States Euro Area
United Kingdom Japan
Notes: Figures show median impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation decrease in oil prices, with 95
percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The horizon is quarterly.
that an oil price fall is good news for the US, the other major economies, as well as for the
global economy.
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Figure 4: E¤ects of Lower Oil Prices on Ination in Various Countries
United States Euro Area
United Kingdom Japan
China
Notes: Figures show median impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation decrease in oil prices, with 95
percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The horizon is quarterly.
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Figure 5: E¤ects of Lower Oil Prices on Real GDP in Various Countries
United States Euro Area
United Kingdom Japan
China
Notes: Figures show median impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation decrease in oil prices, with 95
percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The horizon is quarterly.
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3 Analyzing oil price changes using monthly data
In what follows we shall mainly focus on the e¤ects of lower oil prices on the US economy
for three reasons. Firstly, the US economy has not been dependent on oil imports as much
as other industrialized economies, with oil production having rst peaked in 1971 (before
the shale oil revolution). In fact, the US started to export crude oil in January 2016 after
a 40-year ban. Secondly, thanks to advances in hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling,
oil production has signicantly expanded in the US over the past 10 years (see Figure 6). US
oil production has risen from 5 million barrels per day (b/d) in January 2008 to 9.2 million
b/d in January 2016, around 84% increase. Thirdly, the US oil and gas sector attracted
signicant investment over the past decade, including small rms issuing large amounts of
debt (estimated over $350 billion just between 2010 and 2014). As a result, the losses for US
investors in equity and bond markets have been substantial following the recent fall in oil
prices, with valuations of US energy companies falling dramatically and the number of gas
and oil companies in the US ling for bankruptcy soaring, which could have indirect e¤ects
on the US economy through secondary or tertiary channels. It is, therefore, important to
re-examine the e¤ects of low oil prices on the US economy, particularly over the post-2008
period. To this end we examine the relationship between oil prices and the stock market
indicator (proxied by S&P 500) and real economic activity (proxied by dividends on the S&P
500) using monthly data from 1946 to 2016.
Figure 6: US Monthly Oil Production (1000 barrels/day)
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Data sources: United States Energy Information Administration (EIA).
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3.1 Has the relationship between real oil and equity prices been
stable over time?
Figure 7 shows the monthly evolution of real oil prices, in 2015 US dollars per barrel, and US
real equity prices, as measured by the S&P 500 index. The gure clearly shows that taking
a relatively long historical perspective (1946-2016), there seems little evidence of a stable
relationship between oil prices and real equity prices. Moreover, Table 2 illustrates that
there are sub-periods where changes in real oil prices and real equity prices are unrelated, as
well as sub-periods over which they are negatively and positively correlated. However, over
the full sample the simple correlation coe¢ cient between the two variables is not statistically
signicant.
Figure 7: Real Oil Prices and Real US Equity Prices (S&P 500), 1946M1-2016M3
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Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
To conduct a more robust statistical analysis we use rolling regressions of the rate of
change of real equity prices on the rate of change of real oil prices, estimated using a 10-year
rolling window, and then plot the estimates of the coe¢ cient of the rate of change of real
oil prices (blue solid) and its two standard error bands (red dashed) in Figure 8. This gure
shows that the coe¢ cients were not statistically di¤erent from zero before 1990, became
negative in 1991 and initially falling (being statistically signicant from 1991 to 2001), and
then eventually rising and becoming positive since the 2008 nancial crisis (being statistically
signicant from 2012 onwards).10 It is then perhaps not surprising that there is no consensus
10We illustrate the robustness of the rolling window estimates to the size of the window in Appendix C.
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Table 2: Correlations between Changes in Real Oil Prices, Equity Prices and
Dividends
Period Real Oil and Real Oil Prices
Equity Prices and Dividends
Full Period
1946M22016M3 0.008 (0.035) -0.105 (0.034)
Sub-Periods
1960M11980M12 0.018 (0.063) -0.071 (0.063)
1981M12000M12 -0.139 (0.064) -0.163 (0.064)
2001M12016M3 0.199 (0.073) -0.252 (0.072)
Sub-Sub-Periods
2001M12007M12 -0.144 (0.109) -0.088 (0.110)
2008M12016M3 0.404 (0.093) -0.329 (0.096)
Notes: A bold correlation highlights signicance, with standard errors in parentheses.
Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
Figure 8: Rolling Estimates of the E¤ects of Changes in Oil Prices on Equity
Prices
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Notes: Rolling estimates of the coe¢ cient of the rate of change of real oil prices and its two standard error
bands. Dependant variable is the rate of change of real US equity prices (S&P 500). The window size is 120
months.
Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
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in the literature on the relationship between oil and equity prices (see, for instance, Jones
and Kaul 1996, Sadorsky 1999, and Wei 2003).11
As Table 2 and Figure 7 show, a signicantly positive relationship between oil and equity
prices has emerged since the global nancial crisis in 2008, which has been discussed exten-
sively by the media as well as by prominent economists (see Bernankes blog at Brookings on
February 2016 and Obstfeld et al.s IMF blog on March 2016) over the last few months. The
question is why is this the case? There could be a number of reasons. Firstly, while markets
are generally e¢ cient and therefore equity prices reect the fundamentals, there are also
episodes when real equity prices do not reect the state of the economy. In such periods any
evidence of a perverse relationship between real equity and oil prices could be due to the dis-
connect between equity markets and economic fundamentals and not necessarily any breaks
in the relationship between oil prices and the real economy. Secondly, Sovereign Wealth
Funds (SWFs) accumulated large assets during the most recent oil boom (2002-2008) and
they have come to play a major role in reserve management of oil revenues.12 The prominent
examples are Norways Government Pension Fund ($830), Abu Dhabi Investment Author-
ity ($773), Saudi Arabias Fund (SAMA) ($685), Kuwait Investment Authority ($592), and
Qatar Investment Authority ($256), with the number in brackets referring to their market
values in billions in June 2015. On average 65% of SWF assets are held in public and private
equities (61% Norway; 72% SAMA; 65% Kuwait; 68% Qatar; 62% Abu Dhabigures based
on 2014). During periods of rising oil prices, these funds are topped up with equity pur-
chases. However, when oil prices are falling most major oil exporters withdraw money from
the funds in order to maintain, for instance, their welfare expenditure. The equity trans-
actions of SWFs in turn induce an unintended positive correlation between oil and equity
prices. Whilst it is true that such e¤ects might not be that large, they could trigger larger
e¤ects due to known market over-reactions.
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between real oil and stock
prices is not stable over time. As such, the recent perverse relationship between equity
returns and oil price changes should not be taken as evidence that lower oil prices are bad
for the real economy.
11The literature has also recently attempted to investigate the di¤erential e¤ects of oil demand and supply
shocks on real and nancial variables. For instance, Kilian and Park (2009) argue that oil supply shocks are
much less important than demand shocks in understanding the evolution of stock prices in the US, while
Kang et al. (2016) argue that both shocks are of comparable importance when it comes to explaining US
real stock returns.
12For the role of SWFs in reserve management of commodity revenues in general, as well as their contri-
bution to macroeconomic stabilization in resource-rich countries, see also Mohaddes and Raissi (2017).
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3.2 Are lower oil prices benecial for the US and the world econ-
omy?
Ideally we need to consider how oil prices and real activity are related (as opposed to equity
markets). However, quarterly GDP series that exist are not su¢ ciently long for a reliable
analysis of output-oil price relationship over di¤erent sub-periods, particularly the post-2008
crisis period. Also, unfortunately, there are no reliable monthly observations on aggregate
real activity. While a number of investigators have used monthly measures of US manu-
facturing output, this is not su¢ ciently representative of an economy such as that of the
US.
Instead we use real dividends on S&P 500 as a proxy for economic activity. The rationale
is that if the demand for companies products does not rise and they do not experience
growth they cannot make prots, and if they do not have enough prots they could not pay
dividends. While it is true that some companies strategically pay dividends even if their
protability is low, this can only be sustained in the short run (say one or two years). In
the long run these companies need to be protable in order to be able to continue paying
out dividends. In other words, there has to be a relationship between real dividends and the
state of the economy in the long run.
Figure 9: Real Oil Prices and Real Dividends (S&P 500), 1946M1-2016M3
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Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
Figure 9 shows the relationship between real oil prices and real dividends on the S&P
500 over the last 71 years, from which we observe that generally lower (higher) oil prices
have been associated with higher (lower) dividends. The last column of Table 2 reports
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the simple correlation between changes in real oil prices and dividends, clearly showing a
negative relationship between them over all sub-periods. More specically the relationships
are statistically signicant for the full sample (1946 to 2016), as well as the two sub-samples,
19812000 and 20112016, but not for the sub-period 19601980. More importantly we nd
that changes in real oil prices are negatively related to changes in real dividends over the
post-2008 crisis period, a relationship which is also statistically highly signicant.
Using a relatively long monthly time series data on dividends and oil prices (19702016)
we estimate rolling regressions (with 10-year windows) of the rate of change of real dividends
on the rate of change of real oil prices, and plot the estimated coe¢ cients of the rate of change
of real oil prices (blue solid) and their two standard error bands (red dashed) in Figure 10.
As can be seen the rolling estimates of the coe¢ cient of real oil price changes on dividends
have been negative over the whole sample period, being statistically signicant for most of
the period. Interestingly enough, the benecial e¤ects of lower oil prices on dividends have
become even stronger over the more recent periods, with the rolling estimates becoming
particularly large and statistically signicant post-2009.13
Figure 10: Rolling Estimates of the E¤ects of Changes in Oil Prices on Real
Dividends
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
1980M1 1989M2 1998M3 2007M4 2016M3
Notes: Rolling estimates of the coe¢ cient of the rate of change of real oil prices and its two standard error
bands based. Dependant variable is the rate of change of real dividends (S&P 500). The window size is 120
months.
Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
The rolling estimates give a clear indication of the changing nature of the relationships
between oil prices, equity prices, and dividends, but do not allow for changing dynamics
13Note that these results are robust to the size of the window, see Appendix C.
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between these variables. Therefore, to check the robustness of the results to the dynamics
of adjustments between oil price changes and the economy, we also estimated autoregressive
distributed lag (ARDL) models, one with the rate of change of real equity and oil prices
and another with the rate of change of real dividends and oil prices.14 Instead of rolling
windows we estimated the ARDL models on the full sample period (1970M1 to 2016M4)
and three sub-samples, namely 1970M11989M12, 1990M12007M12, and 2008M12016M4.
We selected the lag order of the ARDL regressions with equity prices using the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) with a maximum lag order set to 12.
The estimates of the long-run coe¢ cient of real oil prices on real equity prices are re-
ported in panel (a) of Table 3, from which we can see that the coe¢ cients are negative
and statistically signicant for the full sample and in the two sub-samples, 19701989 and
19902007, but the long-run estimate is positive and statistically signicant for the 2008
2016 sub-sample. This provides further evidence that the relationship between these two
variables are not stable, and matches the results in Section 3.1 and Figure 8.
The estimates of the ARDL regressions with real dividends and real oil prices, are summa-
rized in panel (b) of Table 3. As can be seen, the estimated coe¢ cient of the oil price variable
on the real dividend variable is negative and statistically signicant in all sub-samples even
in the post-2008 period.15 These results are in line with those using simple correlations in
Table 2 and rolling estimates in Figure 10, and therefore suggest that lower oil prices have
been good for the US economy, even if we only consider the period after the Great Recession.
For completeness, we also considered other measures of monthly economic activity, namely
US industrial production and manufacturing indices, which are widely used in empirical work
with monthly data. As before we estimated ARDL models over the full sample and the three
sub-samples, now between the oil price variable and these two new measures of economic
activity. The results for the ARDL models with industrial production are reported in panel
(c) and for the ones with manufacturing production in panel (d) of Table 3. The coe¢ cient
of the oil price variable is negative in all sample periods and for both activity measures, but
they are statistically signicant only for the full sample and the rst sub-sample, 1970M1
1989M12, thus supporting the results provided in panel (b) of Table 3.
To summarize, unlike the relationship between equity and oil prices, we nd a stable
14In a series of papers, Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran (1997), and Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999)
show that the traditional ARDL approach can be used for long-run analysis, and that the ARDL methodology
is valid regardless of whether the regressors are exogenous, or endogenous, and irrespective of whether the
underlying variables are I (0) or I (1). See also the discussion in Chudik et al. (2016, 2017)
15In the case of the ARDL models with real dividends, we initially selected the lag orders using the AIC,
however, given the smoothness of the real dividend series and given that AIC selected a large number of
lags, the estimates were not reliable. We therefore based the lag order selection on the Schwarz Bayesian
Criterion.
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Table 3: Estimates of the Long-run Coe¢ cients of Real Oil Prices based on
Various ARDL Regressions and Sub-samples, 1970M12016M4
1970M12016M4 1970M11989M12 1990M12007M12 2008M12016M4
(a) ARDL Model with Real Equity Prices
Oil Price Coe¢ cient  0:159  0:176  0:185 0:202
(0:073) (0:100) (0:039) (0:118)
ARDL Order (6; 12) (2; 12) (1; 1) (4; 4)
(b) ARDL Model with Real Dividends
Oil Price Coe¢ cient  0:016  0:046  0:092  0:111
(0:017) (0:014) (0:043) (0:048)
ARDL Order (1; 3) (2; 1) (5; 0) (1; 0)
(c) ARDL Model with Industrial Production
Oil Price Coe¢ cient  0:053  0:084  0:019  0:098
(0:025) (0:029) (0:014) (0:075)
ARDL Order (12; 11) (2; 11) (3; 3) (12; 10)
(d) ARDL Model with Manufacturing Production
Oil Price Coe¢ cient  0:075  0:116  0:022  0:067
(0:027) (0:036) (0:017) (0:063)
ARDL Order (3,11) (2; 11) (3,3) (12,8)
Notes: Symbols ***, **, and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The lag order of
the ARDL regressions with real equity prices, industrial and manufacturing production indices were selected
using the Akaike Information Criterion with a maximum lag order set to 12. For the ARDL models with
real dividends the lag order was selected using the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; see also footnote 15.
Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
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negative relationship between oil prices, dividends and monthly real activity measures such
as industrial production, which supports the results from the GVAR-Oil model (see Figure
5), and does not support the view that lower oil prices have not been good for the US
economy since the 2008 nancial crisis.
Nevertheless, the fall in oil prices has hit the major oil exporters the hardest given
that almost all of them substantially expanded their welfare programs during the period of
unusually high oil prices that preceded the current price falls. For instance, post-2011, the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries increased their social spending by around $150
billion. Saudi Arabia increased government employees pay and benets by $93 billion and
similar increases in welfare were put into e¤ect by other GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, and the UAE); see, for instance, Abdel Ghafar (2016) and Devarajan (2016).
In Iran, despite the sanctions and the threat of more sanctions, the Ahmadinejad government
initiated monthly cash payments to all households irrespective of their income or wealth, and
raided the oil stabilization fund (rather than enhancing it) to partly pay for the program;
see Mohaddes and Pesaran (2014). It is not surprising therefore that the fall in oil prices has
forced oil exporters to cut back on their welfare programs, withdraw from their oil funds,
and attempt to diversify their economies.
At the world level, however, we would expect the increase in spending by oil importers to
exceed the decline in expenditure by oil exporters (given their di¤erent marginal propensities
to consume/invest), and so eventually lower oil prices should also be benecial for the world
economy. This was also clearly illustrated within the GVAR-Oil framework in Section 2.2;
see, in particular, the responses of global and country level GDPs following a fall in oil prices
in Figures 2 and 5. This in turn implies that demand for energy is going to start to rise,
which will put upward pressure on oil prices in the medium term, and the equilibrating
process starts to take place.
4 Concluding remarks
As with all markets, lower oil prices will eventually lead to higher demand and lower supplies.
The benecial income e¤ects of lower oil prices will show up in higher oil demand by oil
importers including the US, while the loss of revenues by oil exporters will act in the opposite
direction, but the net e¤ect is likely to be positive. On the supply side, the response to
price changes is likely to di¤er markedly across major oil producers. Non-OPEC producers,
particularly US oil producers, tend to respond reasonably quickly and positively (negatively)
to oil price rises (falls). As noted earlier, US production had been rising since 2008, but
peaked around April 2015 (at 9.45 million b/d) and since then, with continued low oil
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prices, has fallen to 8.45 million b/d in the rst week of October 2016 (see Figure 6). This
large fall in oil production is mainly due to the fact that unconventional oil (which now forms
around half of US oil output) tends to respond to oil price changes very much like any other
manufacturing process. In fact, since mid-2014 the number of US oil and gas companies that
have led for bankruptcy has risen substantially and is soon expected to overtake the 68
bankruptcies that were led at the peak of the dot-com bust in 2002-2003 (see Reuters on
4 May, 2016). Moreover, the European Central Bank (2016) recently estimated that energy
related investments in the United States have fallen by 65% cumulatively since mid-2014,
with the energy sector contribution to GDP growth in the US being overall negative.
In contrast to the US, oil production from OPEC is likely to be less responsive to price
changes, with political factors playing a signicant role in the process. It has long been
argued, dating back to the rst oil crisis of 1973/74, that major oil exporters that heavily
depend on oil revenues, set their oil production to achieve a given level of oil revenues (the
so-called target revenue model, see Bénard (1980), Crémer and Salehi-Isfahani (1980), and
Teece (1982)), and as a result respond perversely to price changes. The result is a backward-
bending supply curve where a sustained fall in oil prices can lead to increased oil production
from some OPEC member countries who own large reserves of low cost oil, a demanding
welfare program, and a fragile political system.
There is an important analogy between the Ricardian theory of rent on agricultural land
and modelling of oil prices. David Ricardo, the famous British economist, observed that rent
rises as land of lower quality are brought under cultivation in conditions of rising demand for
agricultural products. In the same way, prot from productive oil elds rise as costlier elds
are brought into production. With signicant heterogeneity of breakeven production costs
across elds in di¤erent parts of the world, as well as across di¤erent types of oil elds within
a given region, it is not surprising that it is the production of the high cost unconventional
oil that is rst to be negatively a¤ected by lower oil prices. This means that oil markets
equilibrate, but very slowly. Oil prices are likely to uctuate within a wide range, the ceiling
being the marginal cost for US shale oil producers (around $60 per barrel). This episodic
process gets further accentuated by new reserve discoveries, technological advances in oil
production and alternative energy sources.
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A Data appendix
A.1 Data sources
The main data source used to estimate the GVAR-Oil model is Smith and Galesi (2014),
which provides quarterly observations for the majority of the variables covering the period
1979Q2-2013Q1. This data can be downloaded from: https://sites.google.com/site/gvarmodelling.
We augment this database with quarterly observations for Iran and for oil production. Data
on consumer price index, GDP, and the exchange rate for Iran for the period 1979Q1-2006Q4
are from Esfahani et al. (2014). These series are updated using the Central Bank of Irans
(CBI) online database as well as several volumes of the CBIs Economic Report and Balance
Sheets and Monthly CPI Workbook. The Iranian GDP data were updated using the In-
ternational Monetary Funds (IMF) International Financial Statistics andWorld Economic
Outlook databases, while the exchange rate data are from the IMF International Finan-
cial Statistics (for the o¢ cial exchange rate) and IMF INS database (for the "free market"
rate).16 Finally, we obtain quarterly oil production series (in thousand barrels per day) from
the U.S. Energy Information Administration International Energy Statistics.17
The analysis in Section 3 was conducted using data from two main sources: real monthly
US equity prices (S&P 500) and real dividends (S&P 500) between 1946M1 and 2016M3 are
from Robert Shillers online database: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm, while
monthly data on industrial production, manufacturing production, and real oil prices are
from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.
A.2 Construction of the variables
Log real GDP, yit, the rate of ination, it, short-term interest rate, rSit, long-term interest
rate, rLit, the log deated exchange rate, epit, and log real equity prices, eqit, are six variables
included in our GVAR-Oil model, as well as most of the GVAR applications in the literature.
These six variables are constructed as
yit = ln(GDPit); it = pit   pit 1; pit = ln(CPIit); epit = ln (Eit=CPIit) ;
rSit = 0:25 ln(1 +R
S
it=100); r
L
it = 0:25 ln(1 +R
L
it=100); eqit = ln (EQit=CPIit) ; (11)
16Data on the "free market" rate are only available from the IMF between 1979Q1 to 2011Q3. We therefore
make use of data from online traders, such as Eranico: www.eranico.com, to complete the series until 2013Q1.
17These data are only available from 1994Q1, so quarterly series from 1979Q2 to 1993Q4 were linearly
interpolated (backward) using annual series. For a description of the interpolation procedure see Section 1.1
of Supplement A of Dees et al. (2007).
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where GDPit is the real Gross Domestic Product at time t for country i, CPIit is the
consumer price index, Eit is the nominal exchange rate in terms of US dollar, EQit is the
nominal Equity Price Index, and RSit and R
L
it are short-term and long-term interest rates,
respectively. In addition to the above variables we also include the log of oil prices, pot , and
the log of oil production, qoit in our dataset.
For Iran only, as in Esfahani et al. (2013), we construct epit as a geometrically weighted
average of the log of the free (eIran;t) and the o¢ cial rates (eIranOF;t)
eIran;;t = eIran;t + (1  )eIranOF;t; (12)
where  represents the proportion of imports by public and private agencies that are traded
at the free market rate, on average. There is little hard evidence on  although, due to
the gradual attempts at currency unication, it is reasonable to expect  to have risen over
time. Initially we set  = 0:70, but smaller values of  = 0:65 and 0:60 resulted in very
similar estimates and test outcomes. We, therefore, only report the results using eIran;;t
with  = 0:70.
The world equity prices, eqt, are computed as a weighted average of country-specic
equity indices (when available), namely
eqt =
NX
i=1
weqi eqit; with
NX
i=1
weqi = 1; (13)
where weqi  0 measures the importance of each countrys equity market in the global
economy. The weight weqi is set to zero in the case of countries without substantial equity
markets. For countries with important equity markets one possibility would be to use PPP-
GDP weights. But using such weights would understate the importance of the U.S. in the
world equity markets which is much more substantial than the 25% PPP-GDP weight of
the United States in the world economy (see Table 4). Therefore, to reect the relative
importance of U.S. nancial markets we set weqUS = 0:50 and allocate the remaining 50% of
the weights to the remaining countries using PPP-GDP weights. The resultant weights, weqi ,
are summarized in Table 4.
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Table 4: PPP-GDP Weights and Global Equity Weights (in percent), averages
over 20072009
Country PPP GDP Global Equity Country PPP GDP Global Equity
Weights (wi) Weights (w
eq
i ) Weights (wi) Weights (w
eq
i )
Argentina 0.99 1.03 Norway 0.48 0.50
Australia 1.42 1.48 New Zealand 0.22 0.23
Brazil 3.44   Peru 0.42  
Canada 2.25 2.33 Philippines 0.55 0.58
China 14.49   South Africa 0.88 0.91
Chile 0.42 0.44 Saudi Arabia 1.02  
Euro Area 17.86 18.56 Singapore 0.44 0.46
India 6.15 6.39 Sweden 0.62 0.65
Indonesia 1.60   Switzerland 0.60 0.62
Iran 1.43   Thailand 0.95 0.98
Japan 7.47 7.76 Turkey 1.79  
Korea 2.28 2.37 UK 3.87 4.02
Malaysia 0.67 0.69 USA 24.93 50.00
Mexico 2.75  
Notes: The euro area block includes 8 of the 11 countries that initially joined the euro on January 1, 1999:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. Source: World Bank World
Development Indicators, 2007-2009.
Table 5: Trade Weights, averages over 20072009
Notes: Trade weights are computed as shares of exports and imports, displayed in columns by country (such
that a column, but not a row, sum to 1). Source: International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics,
2007-2009.
29
A.3 Trade weights
The trade weights, wij, used to calculate the ve foreign variables
 
yit; 

it; ep

it; r
S
it ; r
L
it

,
are based on data from the International Monetary Funds Direction of Trade Statistics
database, and are given in the 27 27 matrix provided in Table 5.
B Tests for weak exogeneity of oil prices
In the GVAR-Oil framework we have provided theoretical arguments that oil prices can be
treated as weakly exogenous in individual country oil supply and income equations. But such
theoretical conditions need not hold in the case some of the major oil producers such as Saudi
Arabia and the United States. Therefore, it is important that we check the validity of our
maintained assumption that oil prices can be treated as weakly exogenous in the country-
specic oil supply and income equations. Note that the issue of testing weak exogeneity
of global and country-specic foreign variables has been an important consideration in the
GVAR modelling approach and has been discussed extensively in Pesaran et al. (2004) and
Dees et al. (2007).18
Table 6: F Tests for Weak Exogeneity of Oil Prices in Country-specic Models
Net Exporters Test Statistics Net Importers Test Statistics
Canada 0:11 (2:68) Brazil 0:48 (3:07)
Indonesia 0:67 (2:68) China 0:00 (3:08)
Iran 0:00 (3:92) United Kingdom 3:01 (3:07)
Mexico 1:02 (2:68) United States 0:89 (2:68)
Norway 0:01 (3:07)
Saudi Arabia 0:67 (3:93)
Notes:  5% critical values in brackets. For more details on testing the weak exogeneity assumption see
Section B.2 of Appendix B of Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016).
Table 6 reports the F -statistics for testing the weak exogeneity of oil prices for the
ten major oil produces together with their associated critical values at the 5% signicance
level.19 The test results support our maintained assumption that international oil prices can
be regarded as weakly exogenous in individual country models. The test statistics for all the
major oil producing countries are well below their critical value with the exception of UK
where the test statistic is just signicant at the 5% level. But overall the null hypothesis
18See Chapter 24 of Pesaran (2015) for details and derivations.
19See Section 3.4 of Dees et al. (2007) for more details.
30
that international oil prices can be taken to be weakly exogenous cannot be rejected. This
is particularly so for Saudi Arabia, Iran and the US.
C Robustness of the rolling window estimates
In this section we check the robustness of our results based on the rolling window estimates
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 to the size of the rolling window. To this end we estimate rolling
regressions of the rate of change of real equity prices on the rate of change of real oil prices
with 8, 9, 11, and 12-year rolling windows, and plot the estimated coe¢ cients of the rate
of change of real oil prices (blue solid) and their two standard error bands (red dashed) in
Figure 11.
Figure 11: Rolling Estimates of the E¤ects of Changes in Oil Prices on Equity
Prices
(a) Window Size: 8 Years (b) Window Size: 9 Years
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(c) Window Size: 11 Years (d) Window Size: 12 Years
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Notes: Rolling estimates of the coe¢ cient of the rate of change of real oil prices and its two standard error
bands. Dependant variable is the rate of change of real US equity prices (S&P 500).
Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
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Very much in line with the results based on a 10-year rolling window reported in Figure 8
of Section 3.1, gures (a) to (d) show that the coe¢ cients were not statistically di¤erent from
zero before 1990, became negative in 1991 and initially falling (being statistically signicant
from 1991 to 2001), and then eventually rising and becoming positive since the 2008 nancial
crisis (being statistically signicant from 2012 onwards).
Figure 12: Rolling Estimates of the E¤ects of Changes in Oil Prices on Real
Dividends
(a) Window Size: 8 Years (b) Window Size: 9 Years
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Notes: Rolling estimates of the coe¢ cient of the rate of change of real oil prices and its two standard error
bands based. Dependant variable is the rate of change of real dividends (S&P 500).
Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
We also estimate rolling regressions (with 8, 9, 11 and 12-year rolling windows) of the
rate of change of real dividends on the rate of change of real oil prices, and plot the estimated
coe¢ cients of the rate of change of real oil prices (blue solid) and their two standard error
bands (red dashed) in Figure 12. As can be seen the rolling estimates of the coe¢ cient of
real oil price changes on dividends have been negative and statistically signicantly for most
of the period; therefore being similar to those with a 10-year window reported in Figure 10
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of Section 3.2. Note that as before, the benecial e¤ects of lower oil prices on dividends have
become even stronger over the more recent episodes, with the rolling estimates becoming
particularly large and statistically signicant post-2009.
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